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The present and near term military balance of power between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union can be expressed in a variety of
net assessments. One can examine the strategic nuclear balance,
the conventional balance in Europe, the maritime balance, and
many others. Such assessments are essential not only for policy
making but for arms control purposes and future force structure
planning. However, to project the future military balance, one
must include an assessment of the base technological balance
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
The West has traditionally relied on a technological edge in
weaponry to offset the numerical advantages of the Soviet Union
and its surrogates. The foundations of high-tech weaponry lie in
the base technologies. Although the U.S. clearly benefits from
the technological developments of its allies, this paper focuses
on the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Its objective is to identify
the critical issues of the technological balance that affect the
future military balance of power.
Figure 1 illustrates the interdependence of a nation's
technology base, its force objectives, and fielded weapons.
While the focus is on the technological bases of the U.S. and the
Soviet Union, such an assessment must address these relation-
ships .
A variety of measures can be used in the arena of net
assessments. In general, they can be categorized as either
"input" or "output" measures. An input measure is some
characteristic of a nation's effort to affect the balance of
Figure 1
interest; it is related? (an evaluation of) to the resource
investment. An output measure is a direct reflection of the
balance; it is an evaluation of the products of the investments.
I will first discuss the utility of input measures in a net
technical assessment.
II. INPUT MEASURES
A net technical assessment input measure evaluates a
nation's resources expended on developing military technologies.
Examples include R&D costs as well as manpower involved in mili-
tary R&D. Input measures are useful for both a macro analysis of
the complete technology picture and for comparing specific tech-
nology areas.
On a macro scale, manpower and monetary comparisons provide
an assessment of the broad base technology investment. The
drawbacks of using these measures lie in the asymmetries between
the U.S. and Soviet economies. Soviet civilian industry produces
little (if any) state of the art or marketable goods, while the
military industry produces high technology weapons. Thus, Soviet
input measures are essentially derived from government expendi-
tures. On the other hand, the U.S. civilian industry is a world
leader in high technology goods. The highly competitive market-
place and the search for knowledge in the fundamental sciences
(much of which is government subsidized) have been the driving
forces. Much of the technology developed by the civilian indus-
try has military applications, especially in the areas of high
speed computers, microelectronics, and computer software. Al-
though I do not suggest that there is a distinct cutoff between
civilian and military industry, or that government funding as
well as government trained personnel are not present in the
private sector, U.S. civilian industry contributes greatly to the
development of military technologies. Hence, U.S. input measures
should include not only government investment but corporate
investment as well.
This asymmetry makes direct comparisons of input measures
difficult. If one ignores U.S. corporate investment, then the
input measure is biased. If one includes corporate investment,
then deciding which corporate investments should be included is
difficult.
In budget testimony to Congress, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&E) used a comparison
of government research, development, testing, and evaluation
(RDT&E) expenditures to influence programming decisions. Figure






















The impression obtained from this figure is that the U.S. is
"behind" in technology investment. The text associated with this
figure states that "Soviet RDT&E has been increasing in real
terms at an average of about 7% per year for 20 years (doubling
in real terms every 10 years) and is growing more than other
Soviet military investments. In the past ten years the dollar
cost of Soviet R&D activities have been estimated $185 billion
more than the U.S. While there is significant uncertainty in
these estimates, this long term trend cannot be allowed to con-
tinue." In this case, the USDR&E chose not to estimate U.S.
corporate investment. The audience is required to estimate that
contribution.
Manpower comparisons have been used by the JCS in testimony
to Congress. One specific measure presented is the number of
Bachelor of Science in Engineering graduates. Figure 2.2 (Ref 2)
is an example. Again, the impression is that the U.S. is "be-
hind." The text associated with this figure is: "Today the U.S.
has about 600,000 full-time scientists and engineers engaged in
all types of R&D, the Soviet Union about 900,000. Although the
productivity of the typical Soviet scientific worker may still be
less than his U.S. counterpart, there is a trend toward parity.
More worrisome still, the U.S. educational system is yielding
only about 50,000 engineering graduates per year, and relatively
few of them are moving into defense related work. The Soviet
Union, on the other hand, graduates over 250,000 engineers per

















• COMPARABLE DATA FOR US. DOES NOT EXIST
SOURCE: NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS
Figure 2.2
These trends, depicted in..., could have a profound effect, over
time, on the U.S. ability to maintain its technological lead."
The implications of these figures are significant. The
measure includes both government as well as corporate
"investment" in technology. The Soviets are investing nearly an
order of magnitude more engineers into their technology base. If
the Soviet Union could mobilize this "army" with Western innova-
tion through glasnost , the technological balance would no longer
show a Western advantage.
In micro-scale, manpower and "dollar" investment comparisons
can provide assessments of not only the relative magnitude of
U.S. and Soviet efforts in a particular technology but also an
indication of the relative importance each nation places on that
technology. For example, if the Soviets significantly increased
RDT&E rubles spent on a specific ASW technology, one could
conclude that they consider this particular technology promising.
Unfortunately, specific technology investment comparisons are
rarely found in open literature. Instead one must rely on clas-
sified publications that include intelligence resources.
III. OUTPUT MEASURES
In the context of net technical assessments, an output
measure is an indicator of the current state of a nation's
technology base. It also reflects the conversion of input meas-
ures into usable products (technology). The primary utility of
technical assessment output measures lies in comparisons of
specific technologies. Although one often hears of the techno-
logical balance in terms of which nation is "ahead technological-
ly," this macro approach is inappropriate for output measures.
Instead, one must first identify the key military technologies
(both present and future), then compare the individual technolo-
gies. For this discussion, I define a key military technology as
one that currently affects, or could in the future affect, the
military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
How, then, are these key military technologies identified?
There are many possible approaches. Conceptually, one could
classify them into two categories: A "reverse" engineering
approach, and a technology exploration approach. In a reverse
engineering approach, either a present or future force structure,
mission area, or specific weapons system is identified and then
work backward to determine what technologies are involved. A
technology exploration approach is primarily focused on emerging
technologies. In this case, a technology is selected, then
brainstormed, to see if a significant military application can be
found. If significantly improved or new weapons systems can be
envisioned a result of applying this technology, then it would be
identified as a "key military technology."
The primary pitfall in attempting to identify key military
technologies is "mirror imaging." The force structures and
capabilities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union reflect unique
national objectives, philosophies, and resources. What may be
considered an important force characteristic in the West may not
apply to the Russian mindset. The converse is also true. An
example of this dichotomy is submarine design. The Soviet Union
has expended a great deal of effort to develop manufacturing
techniques for titanium hulled submarines. These submarines can
dive much deeper than those in Western navies. The U.S. Navy, in
particular, maintains that such a capability is not worth the
enormous expense (It would be much more expensive for the U.S. to
build a titanium hulled submarine than it has cost the Soviets).
It is probably safe to say that from both the U.S. and the Soviet
Navy's perspective, each considers itself "correct." The ques-
tion is: Is the titanium hull construction capability a "key
military technology"? The answer to this question depends on
one's perspective: To a Soviet submariner, probably; to an
American submariner, probably not. Certainly, such a capability
is important to at least one of the nation's in question, and
hence, it would seem appropriate to include these "disputed"
technologies on a key military technology list.
In budget testimony to Congress, both the USDR&E and the JCS
use the output measure "key military technologies" in the form of
technology balance charts. These technology balance charts have
been used by the USDR&E in testimony supporting the FY 83 and
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subsequent defense budgets. They have been used by both the
JCS and the USDR&E through FY-87. Comparisons between the charts
used by these two organizations indicate that they do use the
same charts. These charts have not been produced by USDR&E or
the USDA since that time, but a similar chart for deployed mili-
tary systems did appear in the 1988 edition of Soviet Military
Power (Ref 3) .
Figure 3.1 (Ref 4) is an example. The text associated with
this figure is: "The importance of technology has never been
more obvious than it is today. Yet, as figure... indicates, the
U.S. lead in several key technologies is slipping. Strong U.S.
and allied technological bases must be maintained if their quali-
tative lead in fielded systems is to be retained."
The listed basic technology areas are general enough that
comparisons can be made on an unclassified level. Within these
general areas, however, if one desired to compare the status of
specific technologies, then classified sources would likely be
involved. I suggest it is unlikely that the classified litera-
ture would contradict the general conclusions presented in these
technology charts.
If, as noted, the U.S. lead in several key technologies is
slipping, then one would expect to see a trend in the listed
technologies that favored the Soviet Union. Figure 3.2 presents
a summary of the technology charts presented by the JCS and
USDR&E to Congress from FY 83 through FY 88 (Ref 4-9).
Note that Automated Controls was dropped from the list in FY 86.
Also, Electronic Warfare was added in FY 85 only to be replaced
by Robotics in FY 87. In addition, Chemical Warfare was added in
11
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3. Conventional Warheads (including
all chemical explosives)





















14. Propulsion (aerospace and ground
vehicles)
15. Radar Sensor





















* The list is limited to 20 technologies, which were selected with the objective
of providing a valid base lor comparing overall US and USSR basic technology.
The list is in alphabetical order. These technologies are "on the shell" and
available lor application. (The technologies are" not Intended 1o compare
technology level In currently deployed military systems.)
The technologies selected have the polcntial (or signilicnnlly changing the
military capability in the next 10 to 20 years. The technologies are not static;
they are improving or have the potential (or significant improvements: new
technologies may appear on future lists.
The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly
In the direction indicated.
The judgements represent overall consensus lor each basic technology area.
The USSR may be superior In some ol the sublechnologies making up each
basic technology.
These average assessments can incorporate a significant variance when
Individual components of a technology are considered.
As of 30 September 1986 I
Figure 3.1
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FY 85 and then was replaced by Life Sciences in FY 87.
Of significant interest are those technologies where the
U.S. does not have a lead or its lead is clearly slipping. Based
on Figure 3.2, I would place the following technologies on this
"danger" list: Aerodynamics/Fluid Dynamics; Conventional War-
heads; Directed Energy; Nuclear Warheads; Optics; and Mobile
Power Sources. This analysis tends to support the JCS claim that
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IV. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
A discussion of the technological balance between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union would be incomplete if it did not include
the subject of technology transfer. Since this subject does not
fall neatly into the categories of either input or output meas-
ures, it is treated separately here.
In the context of a net technical assessment, the issue is
not one of prevention, but damage assessment. The Soviet's
massive effort in this area includes use of the KGB and GRU
intelligence organizations; the facilities of the Ministry of
Foreign Trade in Western countries, including state owned
businesses and corporations; the State Committee on Science and
Technology, which arranges government science and technology
agreements; and the Academies of Science and their Institutes,
which have contacts with Western universities and research
institutes, both directly and through technical conferences (Ref
10) .
Despite efforts by the U.S. and its allies to slow down the
rate of technology transfer, the Soviet Union will continue to
obtain some of our vital military technology. The factors that
affect the impact of technology transfer include:




Which country can most quickly adapt a new technology
to field a new or significantly improved weapons system.
Although not all inclusive, these two factors provide a framework
for discussing the technology transfer issue.
36
These factors are interrelated. Figure 4.1 illustrates a
simplified flowpath of U.S. technology from inception to a field-
ed weapon. The five general stages are:
1. Idea/Discovery Stage: In this stage, a research team
either formulates a new theory or discovers a new phenomenon that
warrants further research. This team could be in a corporation,
university, or within a government agency.
2. Verification/Demonstration Stage: In this stage, the
theory is demonstrated experimentally, or the phenomenon is
verified independently by several research teams.
3. Marketing Stage: In this stage, the validated
technology is "sold" to a DOD activity as being of possible use
in a new/improved weapons system. If the project had not
previously been associated with a government agency, it is in
this stage that a classification or export controls could be
assigned.
4. Weapons Development/Procurement Stage: In this stage,
the technology is incorporated into the procurement process. It
is here that production and manufacturing considerations enter.
5. Fielded Weapon Stage: In this stage, the technology is
fielded as part of a weapons systems.
Although not a technology development stage itself, Force
Objectives was included in this figure to emphasize the concept
previously illustrated in Figure 1; technological development
influences, and is influenced by, force objectives.
The primary difficulty in assessing the role of technology


















fundamental differences in the philosophy of weapons development
in the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The U.S. tends to wait for
"technological breakthroughs" before procuring a new weapons
system while the Soviets rely on freguent, incremental improve-
ments in their weapons systems.
It would seem, then, that much of the "damage" of technology
transfer occurs in the later stages of technology development
such as the Weapons Development/Procurement Stage. From this
perspective, new U.S. hardware, both military and civilian, is a
"prime Soviet target." Acguisition of such hardware not only
directly assists their military forces but also contributes to
their base technology. By "reverse engineering" U.S. hardware,
the Soviets can identify the production tools and processes
necessary to manufacture the particular piece of eguipment. If
these tools can also be acguired, then this new hardware technol-
ogy essentially becomes a part of their technology base.
On the other end of the spectrum of technology targets is
U.S. research in the fundamental sciences. As noted, several
Soviet organizations can acguire this knowledge guite "legally."
Although it might seem that U.S. innovation would win a
particular technology race, Soviet acguisition of the new tech-
nology at all stages of its development would enable parallel




A net technical assessment must include a variety of
parameters. These include manpower and monetary input measures,
key military technology output measures, and a damage assessment
of technology transfer. Although a few defense agencies have
addressed these parameters individually, a complete technology
assessment has not been attempted. The complexities of perform-
ing such an assessment have been identified, and at first glance,
appear rather prohibitive.
The offices of the USDR&E and the JCS have intermittently
brought these issues to the attention of Congress. Although
these offices have shown that the U.S. maintains a technological
lead in most areas, there are several key technology areas where
U.S. and the Soviet Union are even or the U.S. is losing its
lead. This fact, combined with a perceived imbalance of R&D
investment expenditures, might suggest that these estimates were
driven by programming considerations. Of particular interest is
the fact that two key technologies of SDI are included on the
technology "danger list."
On the other hand, if the technology estimates are
"unbiased," then a disturbing trend is evident. The loss of
technological leads in several key areas combined with an ex-
traordinary mismatch in graduating engineers suggests that these
estimates are indicative of a potentially profound change in the
future military balance of power.
Although a few defense agencies have addressed the issues of
the technological balance of power individually, a complete
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technology assessment has not been attempted. The complexities
of performing such an assessment have been identified, and at
first glance, appear to be rather prohibitive.
It is imperative that our nation's military and civilian
leaders identify the force reguirements of our future military
forces. These forces must be consistent not only with U.S.
national objectives, but must address the challenges of our
potential adversaries. Part of this process must include a
projection of feasible technologies that could be deployed in
future weapons systems. The cornerstone of these future weapons
is basic technology. Unless the U.S. and its allies are willing
to trust the future military balance of power to "lucky guesses,"
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